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The Power of Inaction: Bank Bailouts in Comparison. By Cornelia Woll. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2014. 224p. $32.50. 
Waltraud Schelkle, London School of Economics and Political Science 
This monograph describes and analyzes the six biggest bank bailouts in the OECD world in 2007-10 
and national reregulation efforts up to 2012. As everybody would expect from Cornelia Woll, a 
political economist from Science Po, this is an unusually readable book, with startling quotes and 
meaningful anecdotes, empirically rich and theoretically stimulating. The author has previously 
worked on business-government relationships in the context of global trade talks. Now she applies 
her expertise to the financial crisis in which this relationship was tested as never before, because at 
no time in history were governments so much involved in providing public goods to business, be it 
the rule of law, defense of national interests in international fora, and social security for their 
employees.  
In 2007-10, the financial industry had every possible incentive to cooperate with monetary, fiscal 
and supervisory authorities trying to save it from the disastrous fallout of financial innovation and 
overextension of credit in the previous decade. And yet, only in two of the six countries—Denmark 
and France-- does the author find that the financial industry cooperated with the government’s 
efforts at helping them. Was this widespread non-cooperation due to unwillingness or due to 
incapacity on the part of relevant financial sector actors? 
The book advances an interesting idea that would turn Mancur Olson’s logic of collective action on 
its head (pp. 7, 58-59): in crisis situations, the ability to refrain from collective action gives actors the 
power to make the other party bear the brunt of costly crisis management. The basic idea is implied 
by iterative games, such as the War of Attrition, in which the payoff varies with the length of the 
game. The more patient players, formalized as having a lower discount rate, will achieve the 
outcome with a more favorable payoff for themselves. However, Cornelia Woll relates this idea to 
the time-honored debate about power, reclaiming territory for qualitative political economy that is 
easily lost to economists with their neat, but also somewhat sterile, models. In a masterful, jargon-
free theory chapter on “the power of inaction,” she distinguishes structural power from productive 
power and maintains that it is the latter that can explain the variation in her case studies. This 
conceptualization challenges structuralists among her fellow political economists with whom she 
sides, however, against the trivial notion of power in public choice theories, namely as being all 
about campaign finance and lobbying.    
The six case studies are preceded by a chapter on regulatory philosophies that is surprisingly 
inconsequential for the following analysis. The author has the ingenious idea of presenting the six 
countries in a pair-wise comparison of those which should take similar measures: the United States 
and the United Kingdom as the two stereotypical liberal market economies with well-organized 
financial interests; France and Germany as the countries with strong representations of collective 
private actors; Ireland and Denmark as the small open economies which are surprisingly similar in 
terms of huge house price bubbles and highly indebted households. For each of the two countries 
compared, the author then proceeds to show how different the rescue measures were. 
With the exception of the Irish government, administrations tried hard to make national financial 
industries to get their act together and share in the rescue effort. The chances for this were good in 
the United States, because the government dealt with only nine systemically relevant banks while 
banks in the City of London with its international presence are too many and diverse. Yet, the nine 
big players flatly refused and forced the US administration to address individual circumstances with 
a plethora of programs under the umbrella of TARP, the Troubled Asset Relief Program. The UK 
government imposed its rescue measures unilaterally, not least nationalization. This approach 
allowed dictating the terms but also shifted the risk onto the taxpayer. The difference in the political 
system, fragmented in the US and centralized in the UK, seems to explain the difference in policy 
outcomes (p.109). Woll’s account of the US-UK bailouts has been disputed by Pepper Culpepper and 
Raphael Reinke (“Structural power and bank bailouts in the United Kingdom and the United States”, 
Politics & Society 42(4), 2014). They consider the structural power of UK banks to be superior to that 
of US banks and claim that UK banks got a better deal.  
This dispute raises the question of how one can measure the revealed power of private actors: by 
the potential risk to public finances at the height of the crisis or by the risk that materialized in terms 
of net costs at the point of winding down the rescue? Would either prove that private risk was 
strategically shifted or is it possible that the banks simply were too weak and unorganized to bear it?  
 Unlike the US government, the French government managed to force the well-connected banks to a 
cooperative solution with a public guarantee as the back-stop for panic. In Germany, the state was 
left with a costly and politically embarrassing bailout: private sector involvement was voluntary and 
the well-connected Deutsche Bank refused to cooperate. The structure of the financial system, 
highly concentrated in France and very heterogeneous in Germany, seems to explain the difference 
(p.137) although incompetence also played a role in Germany. Incompetence certainly is the decisive 
factor in the Ireland-Denmark comparison. The Irish “chicken game” (p.164) ended with the worst 
outcome for both, the banks being stupefied by greed while the government wavered between 
denial and panic. The Danish government, by contrast, solved the collective action problem of its 
banks and coordinated the private rescue efforts unobtrusively.  
These fascinating case studies have not convinced me of the financial industry’s power of inaction, 
however, not even in Ireland and Germany where the risks and possibly the final costs of bank 
bailouts were shifted onto the public purse. It is to the author’s credit that she does not belabor the 
point and gives readers the evidence and her balanced interpretation so that they can draw their 
own conclusions.  
The case studies still show an important point for political economists: in a crisis, it is not the 
strength but the weakness of private actors which governments must fear. They are exposed to 
what Dani Rodrik and Richard Zeckhauser called “the dilemma of government responsiveness” 
(Journal of Policy Analysis & Management, 7(4), 1988). Public authorities can be exploited by private 
actors if these private actors are more valuable as a going concern.  The concern was the – perceived 
or real – importance of banks for the capitalist economy. Woll’s insight is that a political economy 
account centered on the classical concept of power is not confined to analyzing power struggles 
analogous to sports contests: purposeful actors directly competing with each other for victory. 
Political economists interested in power can also study the weakness of strength (here: 
governments) and the strength of weakness (here: the financial industry), even when the sources of 
strength are beyond the powerful party’s control. The model for the banks’ behavior is the famous 
cartoon about Asterix and the Romans by Goscinny and Uderzo:  anarchy, helped by the occasional 
dose of magic (read: financial innovation), withstands the imposition of order. Woll’s book is a must-
read for political economists.  
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